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Abstract 
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) norm is usually framed in apolitical terms of civilian protection.  
This paper aims to challenge that depiction and demonstrate the deeply political nature of the RtoP, 
which is often elided or denied by its proponents.  In order to achieve this, the paper will first look to the 
RtoP literature to demonstrate the depoliticisation of the norm, evident in the reference to the 
‘international community’ or the ‘conscience of mankind’ as decisive factors in determining when the 
responsibility to protect has been breached and what should be done to rectify the situation.  I will then 
turn to a case study of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya.  In this situation, the initial calls for 
intervention were premised upon the protection of civilian life against the murderous intent of the 
Gaddafi regime.  The NATO action that followed the initial UN authorization, however, went far beyond 
the authority to protect civilians and strayed into the highly political realm of regime change, to the extent 
that the intervening forces became heavy participants in the forced displacement and massacre that 
occurred during the siege of Sirte.  Taking sides, in this case, meant deciding who represented good 
and evil participating in violence against civilians of a similar nature to that which called forth the 
intervention in the first place.  This example will be used to demonstrate the inevitable ‘fall’ into politics 
– and a profoundly ‘sovereign’ politics at that – that will accompany any physical attempt to protect 
civilians in the context of a civil war. 
 
 
Introduction  
In the final days of the Libyan civil war in late 2011, the town of Sirte became the 
central battleground.  This town, with a population of around 100,000, faced an 
incessant barrage of artillery and street-to-street fighting on the ground and 
bombardment from the air as a combination of Libyan rebels and NATO air power 
attempted to wipe out any remaining resistance to the rebellion.  The impact on the 
population of this city was massive.  Tens of thousands fled as the siege intensified 
between August and October, with shortages of food, water and medical supplies 
affecting the entire population of the city.  Most recent estimates suggest that one third 
of the population has still not returned. The numbers of civilians that were killed or 
wounded during the siege appear to be unknown.  
I will return to some accounts and images of the siege of Sirte later in this paper, 
suffice it to say at this point that the issue at stake in relation to this event is the role 
played by NATO and the corresponding effects this may have for our understanding of 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).   Advocates for the R2P were amongst the most 
strident supporters of military intervention in Libya in early 2011 and many have 
subsequently suggested that the removal of the Gaddafi regime represents a success in 
terms of advancing the R2P norm.  In this context, the NATO participation in the siege 
of Sirte is troubling. Given that the UN Security Council mandate was couched in terms 
of ‘human protection’, how can participation in a siege that led to the death and 
displacement of thousands of civilians from Sirte be justified?  This question leads us 
toward the problem of political neutrality in humanitarian discourse, particularly in 
instances where force is employed for ostensibly humanitarian purposes.  Can it really 
be maintained that the R2P norm is solely about the protection of human life and is not 
attached to any particular political or ideological purpose?  And if we argue, as Michael 
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Ignatieff (2004) has done, that in situations of intense civil conflict we need to think in 
terms of ‘lesser evils’ and accept that the price of protection for some may be the death 
or displacement of others, how are these calculations made and accounted for in R2P 
thought? 
In addressing these questions, this paper will begin with a definition of the 
political.  Here, I will specifically focus on Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, 
which presents political activity in terms of a friend/enemy distinction that maintains 
‘the ever present possibility of combat’ (Schmitt 1996, p. 32).  I will then show, by 
reference to the R2P in relation to the Libyan crisis, that the use of force for ‘human 
protection purposes’ relies on an intensely political definition of the human in which 
the real possibility of killing and forced displacement necessarily remains.  This 
problem will be illustrated with particular reference to the siege of Sirte.  Finally, I will 
argue that the divisive politics of any intervention that takes place under the R2P 
negates the purported universalism of the doctrine and suggests instead that there is 
necessarily a political and ideological lens through which (good) friends and (evil) 
enemies are distinguished.  This, I will suggest, is the inevitable product of a doctrine 
that seeks to deal with the problem of sovereignty by asserting that it is purely 
normative and can be transformed through creative redefinition.  It is precisely the 
denial of the relevance of power in R2P theory that leads to a situation where the 
consequences of the exercise of lethal power in ‘real-world’ crises cannot be fully 
acknowledged and where potential strategies for intervention that may result in more 
effective ‘human protection’ are overlooked. 
 
Defining ‘the political’  
Any attempt to demonstrate the political nature of the R2P must first address the 
difficult question of the definition of ‘the political’.  As indicated in the introduction, 
this paper, whilst maintaining an awareness of the contested and controversial nature 
of Schmitt’s contributions to legal and political theory, will focus upon the definition 
he put forward in The Concept of the Political, which aimed to transcend 
problematically circular definitions of politics and the state (Schmitt 1996, pp. 20-22).  
Here, Schmitt (1996, p. 26) makes the claim that ‘the specific political distinction to 
which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy’ 
and that this ‘corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other antitheses: good 
and evil in the moral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on’.  The 
designated enemy, according to Schmitt (1996, p. 27), is ‘the other, the stranger’ who 
is ‘in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in 
extreme cases conflicts with him are possible’.  Importantly, for the purposes of this 
paper, Schmitt (1996, p. 27) maintains that conflicts with the enemy in extreme cases 
‘can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment 
of a neutral and disinterested third party.’  This element of the definition is vital for a 
critique of the R2P, which claims to be such a general norm that provides a tool for 
neutral and disinterested judgment.  I will return to this issue below. 
Schmitt’s definition of the political has, of course, been subject to a tremendous 
amount of critique.  The general tenor of such critiques is that Schmitt inaugurated and 
espoused the belief that the friend/enemy distinction was a normative good and that war 
was something to be encouraged or embraced.  Such caricatures are in fact carefully 
and directly refuted in The Concept of the Political, as Schmitt maintains that: 
 
It is irrelevant here whether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant of 
barbaric times that nations continue to group themselves according to friend and enemy, or 
hopes that the antithesis will one day vanish from the world, or whether it is perhaps sound 
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pedagogic reasoning to imagine that enemies no longer exist at all.  The concern here is neither 
with abstractions nor with normative ideals, but with inherent reality and the real possibility of 
such a distinction (Schmitt 1996, p. 28, emphasis added). 
 
The point is not, therefore, that states are or should be constantly at war with one 
another, but that the possibility can never be excluded that such existential conflicts 
may arise between human collectivities.  As for Realism in international relations more 
broadly, it is this sense of uncertainty and the (at least present) inability to guarantee 
against the emergence of such a conflict that draws us back to the question of 
sovereignty; that is, how would such conflicts be decided were the extreme case to 
arise?  
It is on this question that Schmitt offers the classic formulation: ‘sovereign is 
he who decides upon the exception.’ This essentially entails a power to decide ‘whether 
there is an extreme emergency as well as what should be done to counter it’ (Schmitt 
1985).  This formulation, first elaborated in Political Theology, is incorporated into The 
Concept of the Political with the claim that the political entity ‘is always the decisive 
entity, and it is sovereign in the sense that the decision about the critical situation, even 
if it is the exception, must always necessarily reside there’ (Schmitt 1996, p. 38).  While 
there is certainly plenty of scope to debate the normative effect of accepting such a 
definition of politics and its relation to sovereignty, it must be highlighted at this point 
that military interventions for human protection purposes always have and always will 
take place in a context of ‘critical situations’ and ‘emergencies’ in which decisive action 
by outside (sovereign) powers is either called for or resisted.  Following Schmitt’s 
(1996, p. 35) logic, it is in the ‘real combat’ of such situations that ‘the most extreme 
consequence of the political grouping of friend and enemy’ is revealed and it is ‘[f]rom 
this most extreme possibility’ that ‘human life derives its specifically political tension’. 
What, then, can be said of principles of ethics, morality or justice that claim to 
be universal in scope? How to respond to the possibility of a politics that does not seek 
to define and fight an enemy, but rather seeks to liberate all people from the politics of 
enmity and the devastating practice of war?  Schmitt’s answer to these questions 
emerges in his widely-cited polemics against the use of universal principles in war and 
against the anti-politics of liberalism in general.  
The foundation of this critique lies in the obvious claim that if the political is 
about the possibility of the friend/enemy distinction that may lead to war, then it is 
necessarily pluralistic in character.  Hence, ‘the political world is a pluriverse, not a 
universe’ (Schmitt 1996, p. 53).  The immediate consequence of this argument is the 
questioning of those who seek to use universal concepts in the political battle against 
the enemy.  The example that Schmitt (1996, p. 54) discusses to illustrate this point is 
the ‘concept of humanity’ which ‘excludes the concept of the enemy, because the 
enemy does not cease to be a human being – and hence there is no specific 
differentiation in that concept’.  When humanity is invoked in war, therefore, it has the 
perverse consequence of establishing a friend/enemy distinction and enabling lethal 
combat on that basis whilst at the same time claiming to be in the interests of all human 
beings.  Hence, Schmitt (1996, p. 54) argues: 
 
To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term, probably has certain 
incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him 
to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity.1 
                                                        
1 This critique has found a place in the philosophy of Giorgio Agamben (Agamben 1998,2005) and 
Jacques Derrida (2005), as well as the political theory of Chantal Mouffe (1993), Slavoj Žižek (1999) 
and a variety of others (Brown 2007; Luoma-Aho 2007; Roach 2005).  Much of this has been in response 
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Moreover, the depoliticizing move of those who fight for humanity can, for 
Schmitt, be located primarily in the liberalism that emerged in Europe and North 
America in the 18th and 19th centuries.  ‘The negation of the political’ that is inherent 
in liberal individualism, he argues, ‘leads to a political practice of distrust toward all 
conceivable political forces and forms of state and government’ which is manifest in ‘a 
series of methods for hindering and controlling the state’s and government’s power’ 
(Schmitt 1996, pp. 69-70).  Liberalism has led, therefore, to the emergence of ‘a new 
and essentially pacifist vocabulary’ in which: 
 
War is condemned but executions, sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of 
treaties, international police, and measures to assure peace remain.  The adversary is thus no 
longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of 
humanity… But this allegedly non-political and apparently even antipolitical system serves 
existing or newly-emerging friend-and-enemy groupings and cannot escape the logic of the 
political (Schmitt 1996, p. 79). 
 
It is this train of thought, from the definition of the political, to the importance of 
sovereignty in the extreme case, to the critique of humanitarianism and liberalism, that 
makes The Concept of the Political a particularly useful text in developing a critique of 
the R2P and humanitarian intervention more broadly. In terms of the immediate issue 
to be faced in this paper, Schmitt provides a lens through which the violence done 
against Gaddafi and his followers in Libya – and particularly the destruction and death 
brought about during the siege of Sirte – is rendered intelligible.  I will return to this 
issue in the analysis of the Libyan intervention later.  First, however, the question of 
whether the R2P maintains the anti-political features of humanitarianism and liberalism 
identified by Schmitt must be considered. 
 
The politics and anti-politics of the R2P in theory 
Can the R2P ‘escape the logic of the political’ or is it eternally beholden to the forging 
of friend/enemy groupings and the potential of lethal combat against the enemy?  Does 
the norm walk a fine line between politics and antipolitics that evades the potentially 
extreme outcomes of each end of the spectrum? In order to address these questions I 
will, in this section, focus on some of the key theoretical principles and documents 
related to the R2P in an attempt to discern whether it does in fact maintain the 
antipolitical liberal stance identified by Schmitt. 
On the face of it, it could well be maintained that the R2P is founded upon 
hostility to the sovereign state and seeks to establish a method ‘for hindering and 
controlling the state’s and government’s power.’  The liberal individualism that forms 
the ethical platform for the R2P has been explicitly rendered in terms of the sovereignty 
of the individual over the sovereignty of the state.  Kofi Annan (1999, pp. 49-50), for 
example, made the famous claim in 1999 that ‘states are now widely understood to be 
instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa.’  This, he suggested, was 
related to an enhancement of ‘individual sovereignty’ brought about by a ‘renewed and 
spreading consciousness of individual rights’.  Annan’s claims tapped directly into the 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’ line of thought that is generally attributed to the work of 
Francis Deng (1996), but which also has some clear antecedents, for example in the 
                                                        
to the re-emergence of humanitarianism as a basis for waging war since the end of the Cold War and in 
response to the excesses of the war on terror, in which the terrorist enemy was rendered as an enemy of 
humanity. 
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earlier work of Michael Reisman (1990).  All espouse a trenchant sense of 
individualism as the foundation for a distinctly modern politics that is reflected in ‘the 
people’s sovereignty rather than the sovereign’s sovereignty’, a phrase used by both 
Reisman (1990, p. 869) and Annan (1999). 
This concept of popular sovereignty is, in turn, grounded upon a mix of natural 
law claims of human rights and universal justice and particular normative claims.  On 
the one hand, in the ICCIS (2001, pp. 13-14) report we find reference to ‘the notion of 
universal justice – justice without borders’, which points toward a claim to being 
beyond politics, while on the other, we see references to ‘the ever-increasing impact of 
international human rights norms, and the increasing impact in international discourse 
of the concept of human security’ as the foundation for a new definition of sovereignty.  
Likewise, Alex Bellamy (2002, p. 489) has attempted to avoid the pitfalls of 
universalism or foundationalism in arguing that ‘Humanitarian intervention ought to be 
seen not in terms of the upholding of universal moral principles, but rather as theory-
informed practice based upon the extension of values created within particular 
communities.’   
In addition, the ICISS report at times indicates the claim to ‘common sense’ of 
the R2P movement, aiming as it does toward a global ‘consensus’ on when to intervene 
for human protection purposes.  In this regard, the report establishes a division between 
those supportive of a softening of state sovereignty for the purposes of intervention and 
those who believe that any such move would amount to neo-colonialism.  The response 
to this political divide comes with the suggestion that ‘in the interest of all those victims 
who suffer and die when leadership and institutions fail, it is crucial that these divisions 
be resolved’ (The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
2001, p. 2).  The path toward resolution, from the R2P perspective, is to walk a middle 
path between the concerns of weaker states concerned with neo-imperialism and 
stronger states concerned with the promotion of ‘universal values’.   
‘Sovereignty as responsibility’ then appears as the shorthand for this 
compromise. The ICISS report (2001, p. 13) insists that this revised concept of 
sovereignty does not constitute a ‘transfer or dilution of state sovereignty,’ which would 
only be affected if a state failed to fulfill its sovereign responsibilities.  In recent years, 
Ban Ki-Moon and Edward Luck (2009) have also been very active in promoting the 
idea that R2P should be understood as strengthening, rather than weakening, state 
sovereignty.  In the Report of the UN Secretary General on ‘Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2009, p. 7), it is emphasized that ‘the responsibility to protect 
is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary’.  
The problem for this approach to sovereignty is that the idea of ‘responsibility’ 
cannot be left as an amorphous normative ideal.  If responsibility is to truly exist, not 
just between sovereign and people, but also between sovereign states and the 
international community, then there must be a mechanism for holding recalcitrant states 
accountable for breaches of that responsibility.  This, in turn, suggests the need to use 
force in extreme cases, a point which is clearly accepted in all formulations of the R2P, 
under the ‘pillar’ of the ‘responsibility to react.’  This being the case, we can clearly 
see that this is a doctrine that encapsulates the possibility of combat against an enemy 
group (that is responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or large scale abuses 
of human rights), and this then leads us directly back into Schmitt’s understanding of 
the political.  The question that follows goes to whether ‘sovereignty’ has actually been 
redefined under the R2P at all. This is an issue I have dealt with elsewhere (Moses 
2012) and will not return to in this paper, suffice it to say that the redefinition of 
sovereignty proposed by the R2P does not necessarily offer any kind of guarantee 
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against the persistence of irresponsible action by interventionist powers in 
contemporary international relations. 
In the introduction to the ICISS report, the objective of any intervention under 
R2P is stated as being for the ‘protection of a population, not defeat of a state’ (The 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, p. XIII).  But 
can human protection and ‘defeat of a state’ in battle be separated in an emergency 
situation?  Is it not the essence of sovereign decision to resolve a crisis by ‘taking 
charge’, which of necessity requires the neutralization and replacement of any pre-
existing sovereign power?  In an incisive critique of Alex Bellamy’s ‘promise of a 
“beyond” to identity and difference’, Gideon Baker (Baker 2010, pp. 93-94) suggests 
that Bellamy’s argument (and perhaps we could also extend this to the ICISS report) 
‘ends up dialectically resolved in the direction of (a particular liberal form of) 
universality.’ In the analysis of the Libyan case that follows, I aim to follow such a 
critique in demonstrating that the R2P is incapable of balancing its aspirations for 
universality and sovereignty and will suggest that the attempt to maintain a universalist, 
humanitarian stance tends toward a denial of the role and effects of power in the 
resolution of emergency situations.  The intervening force, I will argue, will invariably 
play the role of ‘king-maker’ (or perhaps king) and this intensely political role may well 
involve participation in acts that look more like war crimes than human protection. 
 
The Politics of the R2P in Libya 
The aim of this section is to work through the various stages of the Libyan crisis and 
intervention in order to understand if, when and how ‘politics’ makes it’s way into the 
R2P in practice.  I will begin by looking at the calls for action made by pro-R2P groups 
and individuals in the early months of 2011, before turning to the UN Security Council 
mandate and the conduct of the intervention itself.  I will then focus on the siege of 
Sirte in order to understand how the goal of ‘human protection’ operated as a political 
license for mass destruction as the Libyan civil war drew to a close. 
 
‘Libya: Time for Decision’ 
The most active and influential R2P lobby group currently in operation is the Global 
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P).  In response to the outbreak of 
violence in Libya from mid-February 2011, the group released a statement on February 
22, condemning the violence ‘against civilians’ being perpetrated by the Libyan 
government and calling for the imposition of a no-fly zone, arms embargo, targeted 
sanctions and referral of the Libyan situation to the ICC for investigation of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity (Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect 2011d).  
While it is difficult to say exactly what effect this may have had on the deliberations of 
the Security Council, the passing of Security Council Resolution 1970 on February 26 
met the suggestions made in the GCR2P statement, with only the no-fly zone being 
absent from the Resolution. 
The civil war in Libya, however, did not let up and on March 4 the GCR2P 
(2011c) again made a statement, this time in the form of an open letter to the Security 
Council, demanding consideration of further prevention, deterrence and protective 
measures.  As with the previous statement, the letter concluded with the reminder that 
‘the world is watching’ and suggested that the Security Council’s ‘credibility is at 
stake.’  This was then followed on March 14 with a statement bearing the title ‘Libya: 
Time for Decision’, which applauded the role of the R2P in generating international 
consensus and bringing about criticism of the behavior of the Gaddafi regime in 
response to the rebellion (Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect 2011b).  The 
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statement insisted that the measures introduced under Security Council Resolution 
1970 were proving to be insufficient and argued that the Arab league call for a no-fly 
zone over Libya should be implemented under a new Security Council mandate.  
Gaddafi was ‘a ruler bent on committing mass atrocities’ and ‘the Libyan regime should 
face the consequences for its brutal actions.’  As such, ‘inaction [on the part of the 
Security Council]… is not justified’ and rapid ‘decisive action’ is necessary. 
Interestingly, the GCR2P statements portray the violence in Libya as being 
entirely one-sided.  The violence is consistently described in terms of ‘crimes’ and 
‘atrocities’ targeted against ‘civilians’, ‘peaceful protestors’, ‘demonstrators’ and ‘the 
population’ and the rebel fighters are labeled as ‘those challenging the government.’ 
Gaddafi’s regime is said to be ‘victimizing its own population’ as it ‘murderously 
reasserts control’.  Despite the clear evidence that a civil war was being fought between 
the government and various rebel groups from mid-February onwards, one statement 
claims to be aiming to ‘stop Libya from falling off the precipice of civil war.’  The 
question that must be raised in this context is why is there such a reluctance to portray 
this situation (and the same may be said for Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, amongst 
others) as a conflict that has reached the level of civil war?  I would argue that this 
reluctance can be traced back to the antipolitics of the R2P, which, in order to function 
according to its own moral platform, must avoid the impression of ‘picking sides’ in a 
conflict of this kind.   
To draw this back into Schmittian terms, it could be argued that the avoidance 
of the term ‘civil war’ represents an attempt at neutralization or perhaps 
‘universalization’ of the friend/enemy grouping.  The interveners are on the side of 
human beings in general and a tyrannical government is repressing these human beings.  
The narrative must then proceed as being ‘against (evil) Gaddafi’ and ‘for (good) 
people’.  The conflict, in other words, must be portrayed as an ‘oppression’ rather than 
as a brutal civil conflict in which both sides have blood on their hands. This raises the 
prospect that those who claim to be fighting ‘for humanity’ want to ‘cheat’, a point to 
which I will return in the conclusion. 
A further compelling issue, implied by the choice of heading for this section, is 
the demand for ‘decision’ that comes from the GCR2P.  There is, within this call for 
decision, a compelling temporal dimension that indicates the immediacy of the crisis 
and the need for decisive action in response.  This example, as with all humanitarian 
crises requiring immediate attention from outsiders, then appears to fit very neatly with 
Schmitt’s understanding of sovereign power: ‘Sovereign is he who decides upon the 
exception.’  Advocates of the R2P might well agree that they are calling for a 
responsible sovereign decision in the absence of the responsible exercise of power by 
the Libyan government.  The problem encountered, however, is that the ‘responsible 
sovereignty’ of the ‘international community’, as exercised by the Security Council, 
cannot be held to account by any higher power and, as such, is able to act in an 
unaccountable (or perhaps ‘irresponsible’) manner in executing its mandate. 
The key mandate, in this particular instance, came with the passing of UNSC 
Resolution 1973, which authorised the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya in order 
‘to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.’  In the seven months that followed, 
‘NATO jets flew some 26,000 sorties, including more than 9,600 strike missions’ under 
the banner ‘Operation Unified Protector’ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2011).  It 
is not my intention to offer a blow-by-blow account of the successes and failures of this 
intervention.  Instead, I will now turn to a particular episode of it that led to the capture 
Libya and the Politics of R2P 8 
and death of Gaddafi and the cessation of the no-fly zone in late October, 2011: the 
siege of Sirte. 
 
‘Human Protection’ in Sirte 
It is difficult to quantify the damage to life and physical infrastructure that took place 
in Sirte between August and October of 2011.  There appears to be no reliable data 
available on total numbers of deaths and injuries, nor of the amount of businesses, 
dwellings and infrastructure that has been destroyed. The UN Human Rights Council 
(2012) published the most thorough analysis of the impacts of the civil war as a whole 
on March 2, 2012.  Supported by extensive interviews and on-scene investigations, the 
report concluded that the Gaddafi regime had indeed been responsible for committing 
‘crimes against humanity and war crimes’ in the context of the civil war.  It also found 
that: 
 
the thuwar (anti-Qadhafi forces) committed serious violations, including war crimes and 
breaches of international human rights law, the latter continuing at the time of the present 
report. The Commission found these violations to include unlawful killing, arbitrary arrest, 
torture, enforced disappearance, indiscriminate attacks, and pillage. It found in particular that 
the thuwar are targeting the Tawergha and other communities (UN Human Rights Council 
2012, p. 2, emphasis added). 
 
The report goes on to applaud NATO for conducting ‘a highly precise campaign with 
a demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties’, although it raises the 
problem of non-cooperation in attempts to establish the facts around a number of 
bombardments of residential dwellings in which civilians were killed.  I will return to 
these issues in a moment with reference to reports published by Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch. 
The more detailed components of the HRC report dealing with the fighting in 
Sirte are sobering. In describing the general destruction in and around the city, the 
Commission (2012, p. 156) found that ‘damage throughout the city was the most 
extensive observed in any location in Libya other than in Tawergha.’ Moreover: 
 
The Commission found that thuwar also used inherently indiscriminate weapons in their 
military offensives against cities perceived as loyalist. Of particular concern is their conduct in 
Sirte. The Commission found that almost every building exhibited damage. The most common 
damage and weapon debris observed was from Grad rockets, and heavy machine-gun fire from 
14.5mm and 23mm weapons. Dozens of buildings are uninhabitable due to their structural 
integrity being compromised, with multiple walls and roofs collapsed. Numerous buildings 
exhibited impacts from shells consistent with fire from 106mm recoilless rifles and 107mm 
rocket artillery, using both High-Explosive Anti-Tank rounds and High Explosive Squash Head 
rounds. Although some of the buildings were likely used by the Qadhafi forces and were 
therefore legitimate targets for attacks, damage was so widespread as to be clearly 
indiscriminate in nature (UN Human Rights Council 2012, p. 16).  
 
These accounts of destruction are accompanied by detailed descriptions of torture, rape, 
pillage and indiscriminate attacks on the city.  One particular incident is described as 
follows: 
 
The Commission was able to establish that tens of Qadhafi soldiers and alleged loyalists were 
executed in October 2011 at the Mahari Hotel in Sirte, Qadhafi’s hometown and last stronghold. 
Local residents told the Commission that a large number of bodies (estimates ranging from 65 
to 78) were discovered on 21 October 2011 at the Mahari Hotel – the day after the end of 
hostilities in Sirte and the capture and killing of Muammar Qadhafi.  Most were discovered in 
the back garden of the hotel, on the side facing the seafront. Other bodies were scattered 
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elsewhere at the hotel’s premises, including the back terrace. At least one victim was hung down 
by his ankle from the first floor banister into the hotel foyer. The victims were lying in close 
proximity to each other; some had their hands bound. Contemporaneous independent reports 
noted bullet holes in the back garden where the bodies were discovered, along with spent 
cartridges of AK-47 and FN rifles, indicating that the victims were killed where they bodies 
were found (UN Human Rights Council 2012, p. 78). 
 
 
In terms of the number of people forced from their homes, the ‘Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 80,000 people had fled 
from Bani Walid and Sirte by October 2011’ (UN Human Rights Council 2012, p. 50).  
As mentioned in the introduction, tens of thousands of these refugees are yet to return 
home, which is perhaps unsurprising given the extent of the damage and the ongoing 
violence that are documented in the HRC report and in images such as those reproduced 
below, which are reminiscent of scenes from Beirut during and after the brutal Lebanese 
civil war of the 1980s. 
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As the rebels maintained their siege of Sirte in September and October, they 
were assisted and protected by NATO air power.  In a report on civilian deaths caused 
by the NATO bombardment of Libya, both Amnesty International (2012) and Human 
Rights Watch (2012) have documented two cases in Sirte that resulted in the deaths of 
at least nine civilians, including five women and three children.  Both organisations, 
along with the HRC, have expressed disappointment at the failure of NATO to 
investigate the deaths of civilians caused by NATO airstrikes or to offer reparations to 
those who lost their homes and their loved ones. 
The documented evidence of what took place in the siege of Sirte tells its own 
story.  It is utterly inconceivable that the damage done to the city can be represented in 
terms of ‘human protection’, which then raises questions about how NATO justified 
participation in the siege and how R2P advocates can claim any degree of success in 
the Libya intervention. These are significant issues for R2P proponents.  If, in fact, war 
crimes were being committed by the Libyan rebels during the civil war and were 
continuing up to and beyond March 2012, why were there no calls from the GCR2P 
and other pro-R2P groups for protective measures for those who were (and are) bearing 
the brunt of these abuses? If we were to draw the ethics of the R2P to their logical 
conclusion, we may well ask why NATO (or another component part of the 
international community) did not respond to the siege of Sirte with a further 
intervention aimed at protecting the civilian inhabitants of that city.  Alternatively, why 
did NATO, in its capacity as protector of the people of Libya, not turn it’s guns upon 
the advancing Libyan rebels and insist that they cease the siege of Sirte? Why was there 
no campaign for the protection of humans in that city? 
Despite these difficult questions, which should have been at the forefront of 
R2P debate throughout the Libyan civil war, the GCR2P released a statement on 
September 20, 2011, just as the siege of Sirte was reaching its devastating crescendo, 
which proudly declared in an open letter to UN member states that ‘lives have been 
saved in… Libya’ as a consequence of ‘significant advances in upholding the 
responsibility to protect.’ I will argue below that it is precisely the inability of R2P 
advocates to acknowledge and take responsibility for their political interventions in 
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foreign conflicts that leads to these perversely hypocritical outcomes.  First, however, 
it is necessary to further examine some of the responses to the Libya intervention, 
particularly from supporters of the R2P. 
 
After Libya: The R2P Perspective 
As is to be expected, the end of the NATO operation in Libya led to a debate over the 
implications it may or may not have had for the future of the R2P.  It is surprising, in 
the context of the war crimes and atrocities described in the Human Rights Council 
report as being committed by the Libyan rebels, that the assessments have generally 
been very positive. Indeed, what is striking in every publication associated with the 
GCR2P on the Libyan crisis is the exceptionally shallow nature of the analysis of the 
conflict.  I have already mentioned the reluctance to call a civil war a civil war, but 
what we find in the later months of 2011, following the fall of Tripoli to the rebel 
alliance, is a maintenance of the argument that Resolution 1973 and the NATO 
bombardment prevented violence against civilians from occurring and indeed ‘saved 
lives’.  In January 2012, for example, Romeo Dallaire (2012) made a speech to the 
Canadian Senate in which he claimed that ‘our forces served honourably in Libya; we 
should be proud of what we did. We saved lives and helped a fledgling democracy.’  
Likewise, Simon Adams (2011), called the intervention ‘the lesser of two evils’ insofar 
as it prevented ‘widespread, indiscriminate and deadly violence against civilians’ from 
occurring in Benghazi. This version of events had also been offered by Lloyd Axworthy 
(2011), who wrote in August 2011 that: 
 
While there will continue to be unfolding and unexpected twists in the Libyan story, the main 
plot is clear: Moammar Gadhafi and his regime have been overturned by a combination of 
powerful, popular democratic forces within Libya and a willingness by certain members of the 
international community to respond to the UN call for intervention to protect the brave civilians 
on the ground. 
 
The ‘main plot’, from Axworthy’s perspective, therefore, appears as a cartoonish battle 
between Gaddafi’s regime on the one hand and ‘brave civilians’ and the ‘international 
community’ on the other.  Aidan Hehir (2012, pp. 17-19), in a brief overview of the 
Libyan intervention and its relation to R2P, also maintains, without any supporting 
evidence, that the intervention brought about a ‘cessation of slaughter’ and suggests 
that ‘the people saved by the use of force in Libya can surely not be ignored in favour 
of those who have died at the hands of similarly repressive governments elsewhere.’  
Perhaps not, but what of those who have died at the hands of the interventionists and 
their allies? 
In a ‘roundtable’ discussion of issues arising from the Libyan intervention, 
published in the midst of the ongoing war, Jennifer Welsh (2011, pp. 258-259) drew 
attention to this problem, stating that one of the important aspects of Resolution 1973: 
 
is the degree to which it shifts the nature of the UN's involvement from one of genuine (or at 
least professed) impartiality--a hallmark of the United Nations' original approach to 
peacekeeping--to one of "taking sides" … With the Libya case, the Council is reasserting its 
right to point its finger at the "wrongdoer”… The by-product of this creep toward partiality is 
that the ambition of the military mission no longer matches the narrowly circumscribed political 
objective of civilian protection. 
 
This issue is also alluded to by James Pattison (2011), who expressed some concern 
about the drift from ‘human protection’ toward ‘regime change’ represented a 
problematic departure from the original aims of the mission and of the R2P in general.   
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Michael Ignatieff, in embracing the ‘lesser evil’ argument and attempting to 
sound a ‘realist’ note in favour of intervention, is reported as saying in relation to Libya 
that ‘intervention will always hinge on giving money or air force to one group of 
ruffians or another...on the ground that we judge to be marginally better than the people 
in charge,’ and that: 
 
it's all about getting your hands dirty because you have to team up with some very bad people, 
and that's necessarily going to go beyond the terms of a UN resolution… Let's be real about 
what we're doing when we do this stuff… If you franchise it, if you use proxies, it's going to be 
messy, it's going to be dirty and sometimes you have to do it anyway (Sweetland Edwards 
2012). 
 
Yet these assessments raise still further questions: Why do you ‘have to do it anyway’? 
How do we know what difference it made to pursue regime change rather than human 
protection? Can these two objectives even be separated in this case? And perhaps most 
importantly, how is it possible to conclude, with Simon Adams, that the consequences 
of the intervention were the ‘lesser of two evils’? 
In a speech at York University on R2P after Libya, Gareth Evans (2011) 
suggested that the Libyan situation passed all of the tests of legitimacy to justify 
intervention under the R2P ‘with flying colours’, but accepted that there could be ‘a 
question mark’ around proportionality.  This vague reference to the level of violence 
and destruction that was actually caused by the intervention is also alluded to in a 
GCR2P (2011a) report which admitted that the mandate given by Resolution 1973 ‘was 
not without its problems’ and that ‘as the conflict dragged on over several months, the 
Libyan intervention proved increasingly problematic on logistical, military and 
political grounds.’  This, however, appears to be about as serious as the condemnation 
of atrocities committed by the Libyan rebel/NATO alliance gets.  Outside of the 
aforementioned reports issued by the Human Rights Council, Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International, I am yet to find a single sustained commentary or analysis by 
any advocate of the R2P that is critical of the civilian deaths caused in Sirte and 
elsewhere as a consequence of the intervention.  In short, then, it appears that there is 
no appetite for any serious investigation into the claim that the intervention ‘saved 
lives’, was ‘proportional’ or was a ‘lesser evil’ in relation to the atrocities that Gaddafi 
may have committed had the intervention not taken place. 
In response to some of the concerns over the exceeding of the UN mandate by 
NATO in Libya, the Brazilian government put forward a ‘concept paper’ at the UN that 
seeks to develop the notion of ‘responsibility while protecting.’  While much of the 
Brazilian paper simply restates the just war principles that are embedded in various 
iterations of the R2P, it also maintains that ‘the use of force must produce as little 
violence and instability as possible and under no circumstance can it generate more 
harm than it was authorized to prevent.’  The problem with such a rule, of course, is 
that it can never be tested in practice.  Whether the killing of innocents in Sirte, 
Tawergha and other parts of Libya was a ‘reasonable’ or ‘proportional’ trade-off for 
the claim that lives were saved in Benghazi cannot be determined by any legal, moral 
or scientific formula.   
The issue at stake here is not just about the moral rules for intervention under 
the R2P.  What these lines of argument ultimately lead to are questions about who 
decides and who is responsible for exercising power in emergency situations. They are, 
in other words, politically charged questions of sovereignty, authority and 
responsibility.  This then returns us to the political nature of the Libya intervention, as 
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an instance of combat between friend and enemy groupings, decided by the actions of 
sovereign powers and presented in terms of a battle for human protection. 
 
 
Conclusion: The R2P and the Politics of Human Protection 
In the aftermath of the Libyan intervention, Alex de Waal (2012) has offered an account 
of the problematic question of ‘human protection’ under the R2P.  Criticising the 
simplistic narratives of ‘idealists’ such as Gareth Evans and Samantha Power, de Waal 
remarked that: ‘In the face of “evil,” the idealists tend to turn righteous and forget to 
ask important questions about what they want to achieve and how. The result is a 
misrepresentation of history and a misunderstanding of the measures that can most 
effectively halt atrocities today.’  In response, he suggests that the political dynamics 
of any situation must be the driving force behind any attempt to halt extreme violence 
in civil conflicts.  Simplistic ethical solutions, such as those promoted by proponents 
of the R2P are to be avoided insofar as they are based upon ‘ethics rather than evidence’ 
and can lead to situations where ‘the best ways to deal with the worst crimes’ are 
undermined. 
What the case of Sirte reveals, in this context, is the way in which an ethical 
doctrine of responsibility has produced an outcome in which no-one has or will be held 
responsible for the violence against the civilians that live in that city.  The implicit 
acceptance of the siege of Sirte as a legitimate practice of human protection under the 
R2P indicates that Gaddafi was responsible for the protection of the people of Libya, 
but that NATO and the Libyan rebels were not. This returns us to the importance of 
sovereignty and politics as they relate to decision in times of crisis.  To an observer that 
was not au fait with the politics of the Libyan war, the siege of Sirte would look like an 
example of an atrocity at least as grave as that which took place in Misrata early in the 
civil war.  How then can one be considered morally acceptable and another considered 
a crime?  The key distinction lies in the question of sovereign power, that is: who had 
sufficient power to define the situation as a crisis requiring an emergency response and 
to ‘restore order’? Who determined the parameters of good and evil? Who exercised 
‘unlimited power’ in this situation? The answer that emerged in Libya was that a 
combination of the powers of NATO and the rebel alliance (the ‘friends’) assumed 
sovereignty and hence a kind of ‘irresponsible responsibility’, in which their opponents 
(the ‘enemy’) became legitimate targets for violent destruction. 
The legitimation of such an action on humanitarian grounds demands the 
articulation of simplistic narratives.  Anne Orford (Orford 1999,2003) has examined 
these narratives in her work on humanitarian intervention, explaining how the ‘knights 
in white armour’ must come to the aid of the ‘symbols of helplessness’ in order to 
overcome the ‘fear of powerlessness’ that accompanies a lack of agency in international 
politics.  While the clarity and simplicity of these narratives are appealing to a broad 
global audience, they obscure the complex politics of the civil conflict and the political 
role of the intervening force.  The claim to act on behalf of humanity in such situations 
works to validate the violence done by the intervening party (and in this case their proxy 
force on the ground) as the advancement of justice or democracy.  To try to include the 
suffering civilians of Sirte or Tawergha under the ‘human protection’ banner, in 
opposition to the revolution, would have rendered the narrative (and hence the mission) 
hopelessly confused and self-defeating. 
The response to this problem and its attendant dangers is to suggest that 
advocates of the R2P develop a more ‘honest’ appraisal of their political role in civil 
wars.  As David Rieff (2011) argued in the midst of the Libyan intervention: 
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The truth is that doctrines like humanitarian intervention and R2P are ways of waging war 
without taking responsibility (or accepting accountability, both moral and democratic) for doing 
so. That is why they are so pernicious, and why, even in cases where an intervention may be 
warranted, far from being an improvement on the traditional way that nations and coalitions of 
states have come to the decision to go to war and how they have waged war, they are actually a 
very large step in the wrong direction. They allow us to pretend we are not going to war, but, 
instead, are just trying to protect the civilian population from harm. War, however, is not police 
work, not armed humanitarianism, not human rights activism with an air force, and it should 
not be allowed to become anything of the kind. 
 
Oscillating between universal and particular values as the foundation for 
‘human protection’ only blurs the question of responsibility and limits the possibilities 
for political engagement.  Such engagement, I believe, is precisely what de Waal and 
Rieff call for in their respective critiques of the R2P in the Libyan context.  This is an 
issue that has also been raised in Anne Orford’s more recent book International 
Authority and the Responsibility to Protect.  Here, Orford (2011, p. location 4126) 
suggests that: 
 
The turn to protection opens up the questions of who can rightly claim to speak in the name 
of the ‘international community’ in a given situation, what vision of protection the 
international community will seek to realise and on whose behalf the responsibility to 
protect will be exercised. These questions are unavoidably political. 
 
What appears to be manifest in the various responses to the Libyan intervention by 
supporters of the R2P is a near total inability to comprehend the material effects of the 
politics that persist at the heart of the R2P and a total inability to take responsibility for 
the real-world failure of the doctrine to protect human life.  Dealing in woefully 
inadequate abstractions revolving around the theme of ‘human protection’ allows little 
serious analysis of political conflict to penetrate the humanitarian narrative of the R2P.  
R2P, to put it another way, does not sit well with the complexity of the material world 
and this leads to the unfortunate situation where the ‘protector’ can become the 
perpetrator or at least the abettor of extreme violence against civilians. This violence 
can then not be recognized as a part of the humanitarian narrative as it disrupts the 
moral clarity and simplicity of the story.  The participation of NATO in the bloody and 
destructive siege of Sirte represents a prime example of this problem. Yet whatever 
NATO was doing in Sirte, it had nothing to do with the protection of human life. What 
does not appear to be well understood by R2P supporters, then, is that the intervention 
in Libya was deeply and irrevocably political from the very start.  It did not suddenly 
become a political act when regime change became the open objective of the 
intervening forces. R2P, in this respect, represents extreme, sovereign politics all the 
way down the line.  Given the failure to acknowledge the abuses that took place in Sirte 
and other parts of Libya under the auspices of the UN Resolution and NATO power, it 
also starts to look a lot like cheating. 
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